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The aim of this paper is to examine economists’ views about the relationship between Marshal-
lian and Walrasian theory. Are they complementary, as is usually believed, or do they constitute 
alternative  research  programmes?  My  paper  compares  two  viewpoints  on  this  matter,  the 
conciliatory and the antagonistic views. After describing these, I present my own standpoint: I do 
believe that there is a Marshall–Walras divide but I have serious objections to the way in which 
the argument for this divide is usually made. In particular, I object to the tendency to treat the 
Marshallian approach as good and the Walrasian one as bad. In the last part of the paper, I dispute 
the view held by several authors that an embryonic general equilibrium model is to be found in 
Marshall’s Principles.  
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Marshall and Walras, the Cambridge and Lausanne masters, are the towering figures of neoclas-
sical economic theory. A testimony to their influence is that the way in which problems are 
posited nowadays can still be traced back to their methodological choices. Beyond doubt, they 
had much in common. They both adhered to marginalist principles. They shared the same 
subjective theory of value grounding market supply and demand functions on agents’ optimising 
behaviour. But, as widely admitted, Marshall and Walras differed sharply in terms of their 
methodological inclinations. The question then is: to what extent did they differ? Are their 
approaches complementary or alternative? The standard view is that Marshall’s partial equilib-
rium analysis and Walras’ general equilibrium analysis are complementary. The first being 
bottom up, the latter top down, they must, it is believed, sooner or later join up. However, a 
minority of economists take the opposite stance, arguing that the Marshallian and Walrasian 
approaches constitute alternative research programmes. A related bone of contention is whether 
Marshall engaged in general equilibrium analysis, Walras’s territory. My purpose in this paper is 
to confront these opposing viewpoints. 
In Section 2, I present the evidence on Marshall and Walras’s opinions of each other. In Section 
3, I ponder the standpoints taken by subsequent economists, examining successively the concilia-
tory and the alternative research programme interpretations. In Section 4, I assess these opposing 
standpoints. Finally, in the last section, I critically examine the claim that a general equilibrium 
model can be found in Marshall’s Principles.  
 
2 Marshall and Walras’s opinions of each other 
Though contemporaries, Marshall and Walras never met
1. While they corresponded occasionally, 
it was in a cold way, devoid of real intellectual discussion. Perhaps they mistrusted each other, 
fearing that one might steal the other’s ideas. Marshall’s attitude towards Walras was “to commit 
himself no further than civility required” (Whitaker 1975: 105). As vividly noted by Groe-
newegen:  
Associations with Walras are in a class of their own in so far as Marshall’s uncollegi-
ality and incivility are concerned. Despite Marshall’s several later claims to have 
come into contact with Walras as early as 1873, contact by correspondence did not 
start until 1883, never led to a personal meeting and fizzled out before the 1880s had 
ended. Perhaps a letter in 1882 from Foxwell to Walras, praising Marshall, induced 
Walras to send Marshall a collection of his early theoretical paper. Marshall recipro-
cated by sending Walras the Economics of Industry, prompting a gift of Walras’s 
Elements of Pure Economics not long thereafter. Marshall’s response to this last gift 
                                                 
1 Cf. Whitaker (1975: 99–107) and Groenewegen (1995).  
 
2 
showed his rudeness in the manner in which it raised matters of priority, demonstrat-
ing once again the high degree of sensitivity Marshall had on the subject. Subsequent 
lack of response to Walras’s theoretical contributions is explicable from the fact that 
Marshall failed to read very far in the Elements. … Walras was subsequently largely 
ignored by Marshall in his public utterances and, on some occasions, even actively 
censored (Groenewegen 1995: 778)
2. 
Walras’s stance was hardly more positive. Being in the underdog position, he had to take a more 
deferential attitude when addressing his Cambridge colleague, but at heart he reciprocated 
Marshall’s opinion, as is evident from his correspondence with third parties
3.  
Later on, Walras’s fears that Marshall might overtake him subsided. By then, he had become 
aware of their differences. In a letter to Barone, dated August 26, 1894, he indicated that he and 
Marshall did not belong to the same school (an opinion that Marshall would probably have 
shared), castigating Marshall as an adversary of the mathematical school (Jaffé 1965, vol. II: 
615). 
 
3 Subsequent opinions  
3.1 The complementary interpretation 
Authors adopting a complementary view of Walras and Marshall’s positions readily admit that 
the two approaches differ in general perspective and method. They view them as complementary 
as they assign the study of isolated parts of the economy to the Marshallian approach and the task 
of piecing these partial results together to the Walrasian approach. In other words, partial 
equilibrium and general equilibrium stand in a relationship of continuity, general equilibrium 
being the extension of partial equilibrium. This is indeed what the ‘partial’ and ‘general’ termi-
nology suggests.  
One of the first authors to express this view was Hicks in his 1934 Econometrica article on 
Walras:  
The modern reader of Walras’s Elements d’Economie Pure is struck by its affinity, 
not with the work of Jevons or Menger, but with that of Marshall. For a quite consid-
erable part of the way Walras and Marshall go together, and when they separate, it is 
a difference of interests, rather than of technique that divides them. While Walras 
was seeking for an analytical instrument capable of easier application to particular 
problems of history or general principles, which underlie the working of an exchange 
economy, Marshall forged experience. Yet, since the followers of Walras cannot al-
                                                 
2 See also Groenewegen (1995: 478).  
3 See his letters to Vergé, dated August 16, 1887 ((Jaffé 1965, vol. II: 220) and his letter to Munro dated October 10, 
1887 ((Jaffé 1965, vol. II: 224).  
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ways afford to be pure philosophers, and Marshallians have their moments of reflec-
tion, the two systems have inevitably tended to grow back into one another as the 
years pass by ([1934] 1983: 86). 
Negishi (1989) trod in Hicks’s footsteps. Acknowledging a difference in purpose between 
Marshall and Walras, he nonetheless hardly viewed their approaches as antagonistic: 
Walrasian models are in general not useful for practical purposes. …Walras’s theo-
retical interest was not in the solution of particular problems but in what Hicks called 
the pursuit of the general principles that underlie the working of a market economy. 
On the other hand, Marshallian theories respectively correspond to special states of 
the real world economy. … Thus, Marshallian models are practically useful to apply 
to what Hicks called particular problems of history or experience (1989: 346) 
It cannot be denied, in any case, that Marshall’s partial equilibrium analysis is an in-
dispensable complement to Walras’s general equilibrium analysis in forming the 
foundations of current mainstream economics (1989: 345). 
Hicks and Negishi’s assessments aim to bring out the fact that Walras and Marshall have 
opposing qualities and flaws — intellectual rigor and aesthetic appeal accompanying real-world 
irrelevance in Walras, while conceptual sloppiness is combined with empirical relevance when it 
comes to Marshall.  
If this complementary view is taken, wanting to construct a specifically Marshallian general 
equilibrium theory makes little sense since this job has been attended to by Walras. As Schum-
peter said in his semi-centennial appraisal of Marshall, “A full elaboration of the theory of 
general equilibrium could only have duplicated the work of Walras” ([1941] 1952: 100). The 
central tenet of the complementary approach is that a relation of continuity exists between partial 
and general equilibrium analysis, i.e. the former is a particular case of the latter. In the Elements 
(Walras 1954), Walras starts his analysis with the study of an exchange economy composed of 
many agents and two goods (oats and wheat). If it can be shown that Marshall’s elementary 
exchange model (the corn model, presented in Book V Chapter 2 of his Principles (1920)) is 
equivalent to the oats–wheat model, the continuity claim can be considered vindicated. 
In a sense, this is the case. As Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) show in Chapter 10 of 
their book, the Marshallian partial equilibrium model can be made identical to the Walrasian two-
good economy model if two important simplifications (which they admit are not benign) are 
made. Both income and substitution effects need to be eliminated. To this end, it suffices to 
assume that the utility function is quasi-linear. Such an assumption was implicitly made by 
Marshall (see Newman 1990). But he expressed the matter differently as a case of a constant 
marginal utility of money. This assumption was appropriate, he declared, whenever the expendi-
ture in the market being studied represented only a small portion of a household’s total expendi-
ture.   
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Mas-Colell et al. take the further step of replacing what was money-holding in Marshall’s 
reasoning with a single composite commodity, representing all the other goods that are present in 
the economy. Thereby they fall back into the Walrasian oats–wheat scenario, except that they 
now have an oats–composite (or wheat–composite) commodity exchange. The Marshallian 
market, initially a fraction of the overall economy, becomes transformed into a two-good 
economy. The continuity claim is thus vindicated. 
However this conclusion can be questioned. First, Marshall’s exchange model with false trading 
is a particular model that cannot be generalised. Whenever market expenditure is significant, the 
constant marginality utility of money  (or of a composite good) must be abandoned. Moreover, 
Marshall wanted to analyse what he considered as the normal form of a market, i.e. an institu-
tional set-up for exchanging a given good against money. A market wherein a good would be 
traded against a composite good would have seemed a preposterous construction to him.  
Another reservation is that Mas-Colell et al.’s point is valid as long as the study is confined to the 
issue of the logical existence of equilibrium. However, it ceases to be so when attention is drawn 
to the institutional set-up and adjustment aspects. In the Walrasian scenario, the realisation of 
equilibrium is due to the adoption of the auctioneer hypothesis and its correlates, price-taking 
agents and the exclusion of disequilibrium trade. In the Marshallian scenario, agents are price 
makers and trade occurs bilaterally. Moreover, Walras’s exchange model is a barter model while, 
by contrast, the Marshallian market is monetary 
4. 
So, if the institutional set-up/adjustment dimension is considered important, the continuity 
conclusion must be dismissed. Small wonder that the authors defending the discontinuity claim 
are also those who insist on the need for economic theory to go beyond the study of the logical 
existence of equilibrium. 
3.2 The alternative-research-programmes interpretation 
While most economists have no qualms about the complementary viewpoint, a few are fiercely 
against it. These economists have usually a Marshallian affiliation. Complaining about the 
predominance of Walrasian economics, they strive to reverse this state of affairs and to rehabili-
tate the Marshallian programme, which they consider to have been stamped out.  
Two streams of thought can be distinguished within the defenders of a Marshall–Walras divide. 
First, we have Milton Friedman and his followers. They support Marshall’s view that economic 
theory should be geared to solving concrete issues. They find that general equilibrium models of 
the economy, unlike industry models, are too abstract to serve such a purpose. They accuse 
general equilibrium theorists of sacrificing relevance to  mathematical elegance. Second, we have 
Clower and Leijonhufvud and their followers, who are not against general equilibrium theory per 
se but rather against Walrasian general equilibrium. They indict it for giving prominence to the 
                                                 
4 Mas-Colell et al.’s (1995) reason as if the numéraire and money were identical, which is not the case.  
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study of the logical existence of equilibrium over that of its formation. They also criticise it for its 
adoption of the auctioneer hypothesis, to them, a betrayal of the explanandum of economic 
theory, a decentralised economy.  
3.2.1 The Friedman line 
Friedman 
5 
To the best of my knowledge, Milton Friedman is the first author to have claimed that there was   
a methodological divide between Walras and Marshall.  In the final section of his 1949 article on 
the Marshallian demand curve, he launched a harsh attack on Walrasian theory, regretting that it 
had overtaken the Marshallian approach in influence. In his oft-quoted words, “We curtsy to 
Marshall but we walk with Walras” (Friedman [1949] 1953: 89).  
To Friedman, Marshall and Walras’s respective purposes and methods were poles apart. To 
Marshall, economic theory was “an engine for the discovery of concrete truth” and models 
needed to be as close as possible to reality. Walras in turn was interested in matters of a more 
abstract nature such as assessing the logical existence of a state of general equilibrium. This led 
Friedman to dismiss Walras on several grounds: that “abstractness, generality, and mathematical 
elegance” had become ends in themselves (Friedman [1949] 1953: 91); that the Walrasian 
approach gave precedence to the realism of assumptions over their predictive ability; that it 
eliminated the industry notion and was bound to endorse the theoretical line of monopolistic 
competition. While the first of these claims has a definite foundation and became a leitmotif of 
subsequent authors discussing the Marshall–Walras divide, the two others are shallower, and have 
rightly been discarded. Finally, Friedman claimed that the difference between the two approaches 
is not a matter of partial versus general equilibrium, a theme to which I shall return in Section 4.  
One of Friedman’s lesser-known writings, a 1951 commentary on a paper presented by Christ at  
a NBER Conference on Business Cycles, is also worth looking at. In his paper Christ (1951) had 
criticised general equilibrium simultaneous equation models à la Klein by claiming that they 
were unable to make short-term predictions. This was of course music to the ears of Friedman, 
who was the discussant of Christ’s paper. In his remarks, he argued that this failure had a broader 
significance: “The probability that such a process [of constructing a model for the economy as a 
whole] will yield a meaningful result seems to me almost negligible” ((Friedman 1951: 113). The 
right line to be taken was to return to the study of  industries: 
The direction of work that seems to me to offer most hope for laying a foundation for 
a workable theory of change is the analysis of parts of the economy in the hope that 
we can find bits of order here and there and gradually combine these bits into a sys-
tematic picture of the whole. In the language of model builders, I believe our chief 
                                                 
5 This section draws on De Vroey (2007).  
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hope is to study the sections covered by individual structural equations separately and 
independently of the economy. (Friedman 1951: 114) 
This quotation brings out the quintessence of Friedman’s position. The names of Walras and 
Marshall are not evoked in this discussion, but they could  have been. In effect, studying the 
individual structural equations separately is nothing other than doing Marshallian industry 
analysis, while Klein’s attempt to grasp the economy as a whole is treading in Walras’s footsteps.  
Friedman returned to assessing Walrasian theory and contrasting it with Marshallian theory in his 
1955 review of Jaffé’s translation of Walras’s Elements. This piece has a less aggressive tone 
than the 1949 article. “Walras’s achievement”, Friedman wrote, “cannot but impress the reader 
with its beauty, its grandeur, its architectonic structure” (1955: 23-4). Walras is also credited with 
having given economists “a framework for organising their ideas”. However, despite these 
laudatory remarks, the bottom-line remains the same: it is  time to return to the business of 
“meaningful theory” (1955: 27). And, “Walras has little to contribute in this direction; for this we 
must turn to other economists, notably, of course, Alfred Marshall. …” (Friedman 1955: 27). 
Friedman did not change his mind over the years. This is evident when looking at the well-known 
discussion between Friedman and his critics organised by Gordon (Friedman 1974). Section 3 of 
Friedman’s “Comments on the Critics” is entitled “What explains the difficulty of communica-
tion?” (between Tobin and himself). His answer to this question was that “the difficulty is a 
different approach to the use of economic theory — the difference between what I termed a 
Marshallian approach and a Walrasian approach in an article I wrote many years ago” (1974: 
145). Friedman went on quoting extensively from his 1949 article. Later, when discussing 
Patinkin, he returned to the same theme of the contrast between Marshall and Walras: 
… Patinkin, even more than Tobin, is Walrasian, concerned with abstract complete-
ness, rather than Marshallian, concerned with the construction of special tools for 
special problems (1974: 159)
6. 
Stigler 
Stigler, Friedman’s long-time accomplice, shared his basic disdain for the Walrasian approach. 
However, he had some complimentary observations to make:  
This writer has no sympathy with those modern economists who spend their time es-
tablishing and counting systems of equations, always discovering with elation that 
their system may be determinate. Indeed the general equilibrium theory has contrib-
uted little to economic analysis beyond an emphasis on the mutual dependence of 
economic phenomena; the problems are far too complicated to be grasped in toto. Yet 
this particular theory [Walras’s] describing the nature of general equilibrium was es-
sential; such an idea had to appear before rigorous study could proceed. It was Wal-
                                                 
6 See also Snowdon and Vane’s (1997) interview with Friedman.  
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ras’s great contribution — one of the few times in the history of post-Smithian eco-
nomics that a fundamentally new idea has emerged (Stigler 1941: 242). 
However, as with Friedman, such compliments should not hide a fundamentally dismissive 
opinion. To Stigler, general equilibrium theory is a vain project: 
The general equilibrium method is not fertile: we sacrifice content to formal general-




Cambridge economists were highly suspicious of Walrasian theory
8. The translation of Walras’s 
Elements of Pure Economics into English by Jaffé in 1954 at last gave them — not only Cam-
bridge economists of course, but also all economists who did not read French — the opportunity 
to have direct contact with his ideas. This event spurred a series of new reactions
9. The most 
famous review was probably Friedman’s ([1955] 1993) evoked above. But Harrod seems to have 
been second to none as far as Walras-bashing is concerned, expressing loudly and clearly 
sentiments that, I suspect, many other economists shared yet dared not express. To Harrod, 
Walras should be put on a par with Keynes — but John Neville not John Maynard Keynes! 
If one regards Walras’s essential task as giving the complete, final and polished proof  
of Adam Smith’s central theorem, then it would seem to follow that he should be ac-
corded a status in the history of economics, not on a level with a great pioneer like J. 
M. Keynes, but rather one similar to that occupied by his father, J. N. Keynes, in the 
history of logic. J. N. Keynes gave a far more complete and highly polished account 
of syllogistic logic than had been given before, and one which is not likely to be im-
proved on. (In fairness to J. N. Keynes one must add that his lucidity and presentation 
were much superior to those of Walras.) (Harrod 1956: 309). 
When it came to comparing the respective merits of Marshall and Walras, Harrod did not hesitate: 
the Cambridge economist deserved the prize.  
When I came to the Principles, I was naturally deeply impressed. I was struck by the 
lucidity of the exposition, the grave thoughtfulness, the sureness of touch, the architec-
                                                 
7 These quotations are both from Stigler’s early writings. The following, much later, wry eulogy to Marshall bears 
witnesses to the constancy of his views: “One should reckon among a scholar’s achievements not only what he 
wrought but also what he prevented. I believe that Marshall, by his towering prestige, delayed the coming-of-age of 
abstract formalism of the Lausanne tradition by at least a generation, and with the aid of his premier student, Keynes, 
by possibly two generations. Marshall insisted that the primary task of economics was the explanation of observable 
economic phenomena, and displayed impatience with theorising which was not closely oriented to that task” (Stigler 
1990: 12). 
8 For example, Clower quotes an extract of a letter from Keynes to Georgescu-Rodan, dated December 1934, which 
runs as follows: “All the same, I shall hope to convince you some day that Walras’s theory and all the others along 
those lines are little better than nonsense!”(Clower ([1975] 1984): 190). 
9 Cf. Bridel (1996).   
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tural quality of the book as a whole, the firmness of the skeleton of abstract thought 
underlying it, the immense pains taken to relate the abstract concepts to the actual phe-
nomena of the world in which we live, the justice done to various points of view, the 
careful reservations, the nuances, the subtlety and the comprehensiveness which has so 
often enabled subsequent generations of teachers to prove to some giddy young enthu-
siast for a new idea that it was in Marshall all the time. … Almost all those general 
qualities that made Marshall’s Principles a great classic, despite the fact that its origi-
nal contributions to pure theory are admittedly limited, are lacking in Walras. He had 
little regard for the actual phenomena of our economic life, no comprehensiveness, few 
reservations and little nuance or subtlety. The presentation is extremely clumsy. There 
is fierce concentration on a single point.…  But this was none other than Adam 
Smith’s  design.  Walras  gave  precise,  explicit  and  mathematical  formulation  to 
thoughts already implicit. To do this was an important task, and it was accomplished 
with thoroughness and some distinction. Precise formulation is always an advantage, 
and the power to make it in economics sometimes demands rare intellectual quality. 
But I would add that the advancement of economics depends on rather different quali-
ties (Harrod 1956: 311). 
More recent authors 
For all its brevity, Friedman’s contrast between Marshall and Walras was etched into the minds of 
many subsequent authors who recognised their own methodological feeling in Friedman’s 
remarks. A testimony to Friedman’s influence is that his ideas have kept being re-expressed, often 
quasi-literally, in essays written decades latter
10. Among his followers,  I will retain just two, 
Daniel Hammond (1992, 1996) and Kevin Hoover (2006a, 2006b), for further commentary. 
To Hammond we owe a fine summary of the methodological differences between the Marshallian 
and the Walrasian approaches: 
Marshallian theory is problem oriented in the following sense: 1) that it is focused on 
actual problems from the world of experience; 2) that one begins analysis of a prob-
lem well-armed with observed and related facts; 3) that the structure of analysis is 
dictated by the specific problem one is dealing with; 4) that real world institutions are 
accounted for and dealt with; 5) that definitions of terms are problem specific; and 6) 
that mathematical considerations do not take a dominant place in the analysis. The 
Walrasian approach is to be more concerned with generality: to make theory more 
abstract, and less connected with problems of policy or experience and institutions, to 
check the theory or otherwise resort to empirical evidence only after the theory has 
been worked out; and to emphasise logical consistency and mathematical elegance 
(Hammond 1992: 226). 
                                                 
10 Mayer (1993) is a striking example.  
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As to Hoover, he uses the Marshall–Walras divide to nail down the differences between Friedman 
and Lucas (Hoover 1984). He also (Hoover 2006a) draws a distinction between theory and 
methodology and claims that the difference between Marshall and Walras is methodological 
rather than theoretical. For example, according to Hoover, Friedman does not criticise Walrasian 
theory but only Walrasian methodology. As to the difference between Marshallian and Walrasian 
methodology, like Friedman, Hoover sees it as a difference “between a theory that is comprehen-
sive and one that is purpose-built” (Hoover 2006a: 81). 
3.2.2 The Clower-Leijonhufvud line 
Clower and Leijonhufvud 
To Friedman, being Marshallian means refusing to accept a general equilibrium perspective 
(more on this in section 4). Other authors, in particular Clower and Leijonhufvud, although 
opposed to Walrasian general equilibrium, are not against general equilibrium per se. What they 
champion is Marshallian general equilibrium, which they view as radically different from 
Walrasian general equilibrium. In particular, they claim that the focus should be on adjustment, 
on the equilibration process rather than on the characteristics of the attractor (the study of the 
logical existence of equilibrium). Clower and Leijonhufvud came to make this claim in an effort 
to rehabilitate Keynes’s theoretical project, which they capture as an attempt to resolve the 
question: “Is the existing economic system, in any significant sense, self-adjusting?” (Clower and 
Leijonhufvud [1975] 1984: 209; their emphasis). They argue that, to get Keynes straight again, it 
is necessary to depart from a Walrasian interpretation of his work and return to a view where his 
Marshallian inclination is re-asserted.  
To Clower and Leijonhufvud, a central component of the Marshall–Walras divide is trade 
technology. To them, a Marshallian economy, the subject matter of Marshallian general equilib-
rium theory, is poles apart from a Walrasian economy, the subject matter of Walrasian general 
equilibrium theory. The former is totally unable to come to grips with the decentralised nature of 
real-world market economies. What is needed is an alternative, Marshallian, account of the trade 
process. Its traits should be that it 
(1) lacks a central information-processing and bill-collecting agency; (2) has, instead, 
middlemen trying to coordinate production and consumption activities in each output 
market separately; (3) makes the management of stocks of inventories essential to the 
co-ordination of these activities; and (4) has the system potentially subject to com-
mercial crises associated with expansions and contractions of the volume of bank and 
non-bank credit. All this might be J.S. Mill or Alfred Marshall (Clower and Leijon-
hufvud [1975] 1984: 217) 
These insights have been reiterated by Clower and Leijonhufvud in several subsequent papers. 
Here I will limit myself to discussing two of Leijonhufvud’s recent articles (2006a; 2006b). In the 
second of these (2006b: 31) he presents a table, taken from Leijonhufvud (1998), summarising  
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the contrast between ‘classical’ (Marshallian) and ‘modern’ (Walrasian) theoretical approaches, 
which is reproduced in Table 1.  
Table 1. Leijonhufvud’s characterisation of the differences between classical (Marshal-
lian) and modern (Walrasian) approaches to economic theory 
Leijonhufvud also draws attention to another contrast between the two approaches: whether they 
provide both a theory and a model (the Marshallian approach), or only a model (the Walrasian 
approach).  In other words, in the Marshallian approach, the theory and the model are distinct 
entities, while Walras inaugurates the ‘modern’ vision, which merges the two. According to 
Leijonhufvud, a theory is a “set of beliefs about the world and about how best to understand it” 
(2006a: 70). The model is the result of transforming theoretical insights into a mathematical 
language. The problem, Leijonhufvud declares, is that not all theoretical ideas can be translated 
into a model. In particular, Marshall’s theoretical ideas were dynamic — he was mainly interested 
in adjustment — but in his time only static mathematical tools were available. Hence the need for 
some compromise. 
Marshall tamed the complex dynamics of his theory by dealing separately with the 
various adjustment processes, while assuming that their adjustment speeds could be 
given a strong ranking such that the thus separate processes would converge on  
point-attractors without interfering with each other (Leijonhufvud 2006a: 69). 
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In the Walrasian approach the situation is different. The adjustment dimension is assumed away 
for “Walrasian systems are always on equilibrium  trajectories” (Leijonhufvud 2006a: 69). 
Moreover, the distinction between theory and model is eradicated, the two terms being under-
stood as synonymous, to Leijonhufvud’s deep regret.  
Colander 
Another author worth mentioning is David Colander for his role in fostering the Clower-
Leijonhufvud research programme. He has edited two volumes of papers putting forward ‘Post-
Walrasian theory’, which is nothing other than a return to Marshallian theory (Colander 1996; 
2006a). The Marshall–Walras divide is a recurrent theme in several of these papers. For example, 
in his introduction to the 2006 volume, Colander criticises the Walrasian approach for its lack of 
attention to institutions, and its assuming away “the complexity of interactions that characterises 
complex systems” (Colander 2006b: 9).  
3.2.3 Walker 
In a series of articles and a book, Walras’s Market Model (Walker 1996), Donald Walker has 
proposed a provocative re-reading of Walras’s Elements. He makes three main claims. First, he 
argues that the third edition of Walras’s book constitutes its apex
11. As to the modifications 
introduced into the fourth edition, he dismisses them as a regression due to Walras’s declining 
intellectual abilities. Second, he claims that the short passage of the Elements where Walras 
describes the functioning of the 3% French rentes on the Paris stock market constitutes the 
foundation of Walras’s theoretical construction. Third, Walker disputes the usual understanding 
of the term ‘model’ as meaning a mathematical model. To him, a model is a theoretical scenario 
about trade technology, i.e. about what allows markets to function, “market institutions, partici-
pants, procedures, rules, and behavioural patterns that determine and express the pricing and 
exchange procedure processes” (Walker 1996: 53). The 3% rentes ‘model’ is then the Walrasian 
model  par excellence. In turn, he calls mathematical models a ‘system of equations’. His claim is 
that the model must have the upper hand over the system of equations. If there is any incongruity 
between them, the system of equations must yield.  
Walker’s ultimate judgment about the Elements is that its mathematical part, which is usually 
viewed as justifying Walras’s place in the pantheon of great economists, is of no interest, and 
ought to be disposed of because of its incompatibility with the ‘model’ of the 3% rentes mar-
ket — quite a revolutionary conclusion, which has been insufficiently stressed. However, for 
Walker, this negative conclusion is hardly dramatic. It does not amount to stating that Walras 
                                                 
11 The Elements went through five successive editions. The first edition consisted of two instalments, published in 
1874 and 1877, the second dates from 1889, the third from 1896, and the fourth from 1900. The fifth edition was 
published posthumously in 1926. The English translation by Jaffé, published in 1954 is based on the fifth edition. 
While the changes from the second to the third and from the fourth to the fifth editions were minimal, substantive 
changes were made in the second and the fourth editions. All commentators agree that the second edition saw 
considerable progress with respect to the first. It was taken for granted that same judgment could be made with 
respect to the changes between the third and the fourth, until Walker claimed the opposite.  
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failed to contribute to economic theory. It is just that, contrary to appearances, the field to which 
he contributed was partial equilibrium analysis — and, as a stout Marshallian, Walker prefers 
good partial equilibrium to bad general equilibrium analysis
12!  
How does Walker’s view fit into my distinction between the complementary and the alternative 
research programmes? It cannot be considered part of the complementary approach. Since, to 
Walker, what is usually called ‘Walrasian general equilibrium theory’ (i.e. Walras’s mathematical 
models) should be dispensed with, there remain no two theoretical streams to be conciliated. 
Should Walker’s view thus be considered part of the alternative research programmes concep-
tion? Yes, but there is a twist. Authors like Clower and Leijonhufvud, who dislike the Walrasian 
approach, nonetheless identify it with the traditional understanding of Walras’s contribution to 
economic theory. In contrast, Walker claims that Walras was no ‘Walrasian’ whenever this 
modifier is understood as referring to the Elements’ mathematical models and/or the Arrow-
Debreu model. To Walker, Walras was, on the contrary, a fully-fledged Marshallian economist
13. 
Hence he can see no divide between Marshall and Walras, unlike the other authors surveyed here. 
Nonetheless, he belongs to the Clower-Leijonhufvud camp, sharing their view about what good 
economic theory should be, i.e. an analysis based on Marshallian principles. In this light, 
Walker’s original contribution can be characterised as whispering to the members of his gang, 
‘Look, guys, that Walras, the alleged leader of the enemy gang, is actually one of ours’! And 
bringing in a new recruit of such  rank is of course a stunning achievement. 
 
4 An assessment 
4.1 A lack of symmetry 
The claim that a Marshall–Walras divide exists is mainly made by Marshallian economists. With 
a few exceptions, Walrasian economists have felt no need to attack the Marshallian approach
14. 
Two factors may explain this state of affairs. The first is that Walrasian economists believe in the 
continuity viewpoint: Mas-Colell et al.’s (1995) book  is a testimony to this. The second is the 
mix of benign neglect and arrogance, which Walrasians typically display towards their Marshal-
                                                 
12 Walker’s views do not stand up to close scrutiny as I have argued in a critical review of his book (De Vroey 
1999a). 
13 Not that Walker qualifies Walras in this way. It is just that he takes for granted that there is no other correct way of 
positing issues than the Marshallian approach. 
14 The only author castigating the Marshallian approach from a Walrasian standpoint that I have encountered in my 
investigation is Paul Samuelson: “But where Marshall threw off two generations of scholars was in his insistence on 
having his cake and eating it too. He would try to treat at the same time cases of less-than-perfect competition and of 
perfect competition. He would try to achieve a spurious verisimilitude by talking about vague biological dynamics, 
and by failing to distinguish between reversible and irreversible developments. He would insist on confusing the 
issue of external economies with the entirely separable (and separate!) issue of varying laws of returns. Marshall was 




lian colleagues. The following passage from an interview with Robert Lucas, a modern herald of 
Walrasian general theory, can be seen as an example of such condescension: 
Question [to Lucas]: You acknowledge that Friedman has had a great influence on 
you, yet his methodological approach is completely different to your own approach to 
macroeconomics. Why did his methodological approach not appeal to you?  
Answer: I like mathematics and general equilibrium theory. Friedman didn’t....  
Question: His methodological approach seems more in keeping with Keynes and 
Marshall.  
Answer: He describes himself as Marshallian, although I don’t know quite what it 
means. Whatever it is, it’s not what I think of myself (Snowdon and Vane1998, 132). 
4.2 Which Marshall? Which Walras? 
Any attempt at confronting Marshall’s and Walras’s approaches faces the difficulty of identifying 
their precise content. Marshall’s writings comprise two distinct streams. Traditionally, the 
emphasis was placed on Book V of the Principles, making Marshall a value- or equilibrium-
theorist. More recently, people interested in Marshall have brought the other stream to the 
forefront, making Marshall the forerunner of evolutionary economics (see Raffaelli 2002). 
Leijonhufvud’s synthesis, presented above in Table 1, definitely tilts towards this second strand. 
Likewise, no unanimity exists about how to interpret Walras’s work. When trying to compare 
Walras’s views with those of Marshall it makes a huge difference whether we are we referring to 
the Elements as interpreted by Jaffé (1983) or by Walker (1996). Moreover, interpreters disagree 
as to whether Walras’s theory and neo-Walrasian theory as reconstructed by Arrow and Debreu 
can be put in the same category. Beyond doubt, this twofold ambiguity puts a heavy strain on the 
project of wanting to draw a contrast between the two approaches. Nontheless, this does not 
render it illegitimate or impossible.   
4.3 My own position 
I definitely take the side of those authors who defend the existence of a Marshall–Walras divide 
(De Vroey 1999b; 2002; 2003).  This standpoint follows from my belief that economic theory 
cannot be concerned exclusively with the issue of the logical existence of equilibrium. The 
institutional set-up and the adjustment towards equilibrium are equally important topics. Once 
this is granted, the continuity viewpoint has to yield.   
That being said, I nonetheless disagree on several scores with authors who defend the existence of 
a Marshall–Walras divide. My bones of contention amount to four, which I shall discuss in turn 
below.   
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The alleged dominance of the Walrasian approach 
First of all, I want to question the recurrent claim by authors who contend that there is a divide 
between Marshall and Walras, that the Walrasian approach has dominated economics for the last 
half century
15. Oddly enough, in view of these authors’ allegiance to empiricism, they provide no 
justification for this claim. This has been the case from Friedman’s 1949 paper onwards. His 
statement that  “We curtsy to Marshall but we walk with Walras”, is certainly a powerful image 
but it is hardly a correct account of the contemporary state of affairs. At the time, Walras’s 
Elements had not been translated into English. Arrow and Debreu had not started their collabora-
tion. Only a few sources (e.g. Stigler 1941) and the works of Cassel and Wicksell were available 
to economists who wished to become acquainted with Walrasian theory but were unable to read 
French, and their account of Walras’s theory was rudimentary. A few works of mathematical 
economics, by authors such as Moore, Hotelling and Schultz, had seen the light of day. Their aim, 
which could not but have looked odd to Walras himself, was to render the Walrasian conceptual 
apparatus statistically operational. Thus, their perspective was poles apart from the line pursued 
by Arrow, Debreu and Mackenzie, which I view as being more faithful to Walras’s own meth-
odological precepts. Admittedly, a revival of Walrasian theory, triggered by Hicks’s Value and 
Capital and Samuelson’s Foundations was under way. It is also true that Friedman was in direct 
contact with some of the few US-located Walrasian economists and enjoyed many opportunities 
to compare his views with theirs when attending seminars at the Cowles Commission. Yet, all in 
all, these economists were a small minority in the profession. Therefore, Friedman’s image is 
totally inappropriate. If the ‘we’ in his epigram means the majority of economists at the time, I 
cannot see how the epigram could be justified. 
True, Walrasian general equilibrium became more important at the end the 1950s and in the two 
following decades, only to peter out in the last decades of the past century, except in the field of 
macroeconomics. Still, my guess is that, even at the height of its prestige, only a minority of 
economists were engaged in it. Prestige is one thing, constituting the conceptual apparatus 
adopted by the majority of the profession is another. Anyhow, this is a matter that could be settled 
empirically, for example by studying the contents of leading academic journals
16. 
An unfair account of the Walrasian approach 
I cannot refrain from thinking that Marshallians treat Walras in an unfair way
17. Again, it all 
began with Friedman’s 1949 paper, a polemical piece rather than a balanced comparison of the 
two approaches
18. The dice are loaded against Walrasian theory, which is presented as a gratui-
tous, somewhat frivolous, attempt at elegance, while Marshallian theory is hailed for its concern 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Hoover (2004: 154) and Colander  (2006c: 51).  
16 To the best of my knowledge, such studies have not been undertaken with the exception of a short paper by Ellig 
(1986). Tabulating citations of Marshall and Walras in the Social Science Index from 1974 to 1984, he observed that 
Marshall received almost five time as many citations as Walras.  
17 This indictment concerns the Friedman rather than the Clower-Leijonhufvud line. 
18 For a detailed criticism of Friedman’s argumentation, see De Vroey (2007).  
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with serious real-world problems. Actually, at the time Friedman had only an indirect knowledge 
of Walrasian theory, and the reason why he attacked it had more to do with his opposition to 
authors who, rightly or wrongly, had put themselves under the Walrasian banner, than with the 
content of the Elements (see De Vroey 2007)
19. While Friedman may be excused for his biased 
account of Walras’s theory, it is less acceptable that economists of following generations have 
contented themselves with repeating his claims instead of addressing the matter afresh.   
Too rudimentary a confrontation 
All commentators agree that Marshall and Walras had different methodological inclinations and 
were pursuing different objectives. What separates them is their opinion as to whether these 
opposing  methodological priorities put Marshall’s and Walras’s theories into different orbits. 
While agreeing with Friedman, Clower and Leijonhufvud and their followers that this is the case,  
I am of the opinion that to date the differences between the two research programmes have been 
described too superficially. A more in-depth study is needed. It should bear on the methodologi-
cal differences but also on other topics. I am thinking of the constitutive concepts of the two 
approaches, in particular the notion of equilibrium upon which they rest, and the way in which the 
time dimension is integrated into their analyses. Another topic that should be addressed is the 
institutional set-up and the representation of the economy underpinning the Marshallian and 
Walrasian approaches. 
Opposing a ‘good’ and a’ bad’ approach 
All the commentators I have mentioned so far take the side of Marshall. I, for one, see no reason 
to give him all the laurels and disparage Walras. I prefer to see the two approaches as alternative 
programmes, each having their pros and cons.  
Marshall and Walras did not disagree on the need to move from the simple to the complex but 
they differed in the strategies they used to this end. Marshall was adept at breaking complex 
problems up into elementary parts, which were then studied in isolation. By contrast, Walras’s 
strategy consisted of simplifying the economy to the extreme without ever departing from the 
study of a complete economy.  
An analogy may be useful here. Marshallian theory can be compared to a roadmap. Such maps 
cover a specific area. The larger their scale, the more detailed the picture of the area they are able 
to provide but the smaller this area is. In turn, Walrasian theory can be compared to a globe, 
which represents the whole earth at once. As to the pros and cons of maps versus globes, they are 
obvious.  Maps permit a small area to be described in detail, but it is impossible to piece them 
together to cover the whole surface of the earth. Globes, on the other hand, provide a great bird’s 
                                                 




eye view of the earth, illuminating the relative positions of the different oceans and continents. 
But they are of little help in solving practical issues, such as finding one’s way around! 
David Warsh in his book, Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations refers to Donald Stoke’s 
Pasteur’s quadrant (Warsh 2006: 102).  
Table 2. Pasteur’s quadrant as applied to the Marshall–Walras divide 
This box-diagram proves to be a fine way of capturing the difference in purpose between 
Marshall and Walras.  The obvious slot for Walrasian theory is the upper-left box. As to Marshal-
lian theory, it certainly ought to be placed in the right column, although it is debateable whether it 
fits better in the upper or the lower slot. My point is to ask on what grounds it can be asserted that 
the right column is superior to the left, once it is admitted that theories which were put forward 
without any consideration of use have generated useful applications in the long run?   
Beyond doubt, the Walrasian approach is of little direct usefulness. All its proponents admit 
this
20. Starting from basic principles, the journey towards concreteness cannot but be long. But 
then Walrasian theorists have their own hierarchy of values. For them, rigour has to have the 
upper hand over relevance. They are adepts of Wittgenstein’s principle that it is best to remain 
mute about whatever cannot be rigorously expressed. Marshallians hold to the opposite view-
point. With reference to Wittgenstein, they would suggest that it is better to say what needs to be 
said clumsily, than to remain mute. When the contrast between the two approaches is drawn in 
such terms, it is clear that no conclusion can be drawn as to the superiority of one or the other. 
Rigour is fine, but it has a price in terms of relevance. Relevance is fine but it has a price in terms 
of rigour. Nothing, expect subjective opinion, supports the claim that one route is better than the 
other
21. 
                                                 
20 Here, I have in mind Walrasian of the old school (the like of Arrow, Debreu and Hahn) and not real business cycle 
Walrasians. 
21 The same point can be made in terms of Leijonhufvud’s distinction between theory and model. As seen,  is firmly 
convinced that the Marshallian-Keynesian theory is right but admits that the tools enabling it to be transformed into a 
model are missing. Still, to him, the theory must have the upper hand over the model; somebody with a different 
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5. Another interpretative quarrel: did Marshall develop a general equilibrium analysis? 
5.1 Schumpeter and others 
The conciliatory position is underpinned by the view that a division of labour has evolved 
between the Marshallian and Walrasian approaches. Marshallian accounts are concerned with 
partial analysis (the study of an isolated fraction of an entire economy, its other parts remaining 
unchanged) while Walrasian accounts consider general analysis (the study of the economy as 
whole, no part being omitted). However, some authors have claimed that Marshall also con-
structed a general equilibrium approach, albeit only in an embryonic way. Joseph Schumpeter is 
one of these as this extract from his History of Economic Analysis (1954) shows:  
The partial-analysis viewpoint is so much in evidence throughout Marshall’s text, 
and the handy concepts of partial analysis that he forged or refurbished have been so 
generally received into current teaching that there is some excuse for those who see 
in Marshall the master of partial analysis and nothing more. All the same, this fails to 
do justice to the depth and range of Marshall’s thought. It is not only that the wider 
conception of the general interdependence of all economic quantities receives inter-
mittent attention in the Principles: Marshall actually formulated this wider concep-
tion — in an embryonic way but still explicitly — in the notes XIV and XXI of the 
Appendix. And the Memorials contain a passage (p. 417), rightly emphasised by Mr. 
Shove that reads: “My whole life has been given and will be given to presenting in 
realistic form as much as I can of my note XXI”. It seems fair, therefore to list Mar-
shall also among the builders of the general-equilibrium analysis per se (Schumpeter 
[1954] 1994: 836)
22.  
Another famous author who adopted Schumpeter’s viewpoint is Lionel Robbins, as his LSE 
Lectures on the History of Economic Thought, reveal:  
The school of Lausanne are always spluttering about the restriction of the British 
School under the influence of Marshall to partial equilibrium analysis. Nonsense! If 
you look at Marshall’s ‘Mathematical Appendix’, you can see that he understood  
perfectly well the generalisation which Walras and his school were elaborating. But 
as a trained mathematician, he felt that there were more interesting things to do, and 
insofar as he was interested in applied economics, well, partial equilibrium was obvi-
ously the instrument to hand. But how anybody who has read Chapters 1 and 2 of 
Book 6 of Marshall, which takes a broad view of the economic system, as foreshad-
                                                                                                                                                       
methodological inclination will stick to the opposite standpoint, that only models matter. To me, there is no objective 
way of deciding which of the these two standpoints is better. 
22 Schumpeter had already made this point in his semi-centennial appraisal of Marshall’s Principles (Schumpeter 
[1941] 1952). Dimand (1990) takes up Schumpeter’s message.  
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owed in Book 5 and Books 3 and 4, could arrive at such a misapprehension beats my 
understanding. I think the Lausanne School did themselves harm by insisting that 
they, and they only, were the proprietors of general equilibrium analysis (Robbins 
1998: 306)
23. 
In my eyes, neither Schumpeter nor Robbins is convincing. The Robbins’s quotation is an 
excellent piece of evidence. Its oral character gives it a stamp of genuineness that would be 
absent from a written text. But then the shallowness of the argumentation is evident as well. Both 
Schumpeter and Robbins speak of authority without providing any justification for their claim. In 
particular, they fail to make it clear exactly what they mean by general equilibrium. The most 
plausible definition of general equilibrium analysis consists of stating that a model can be 
considered as ‘general equilibrium’ as soon as its object of study is an entire economy rather than 
a fraction of it. The immediate implication is that all models that fail to meet this criterion must 
be considered as partial equilibrium models. The joint study of two markets (for example the 
market for a given good and the markets for its inputs) constitutes partial equilibrium even it is 
concerned with an interdependency phenomenon. If Schumpeter or Robbins — or, for that matter, 
their present-day followers — disagree with this definition, they should make clear the content of 
their alternative conception.  
As soon as the line between general and non-general equilibrium is drawn in this way, the claim 
that Marshall’s Mathematical Note XXI generalised his partial equilibrium theory into a general 
equilibrium analysis, breaks down. Marshall’s note is concerned with the phenomenon of joined 
and composite supply and demand. Clearly an element of interdependency is involved. But 
widening the scope of the analysis from a single market to a group of related markets cannot be 
viewed as tantamount to analysing an entire economy.  
Turning to another argument evoked by Schumpeter and often repeated subsequently, the fact that 
Marshall wrote to John Bates Clark in 1908 that all his life had been devoted to giving flesh to 
this note, should not be taken for more than it was — a declaration of intent. Authors must be 
judged on their theories rather than on their meta-theoretical comments.  
To conclude, I agree with Whitaker who wrote: 
Marshall’s treatment of market interdependence fell far short of a full theory of gen-
eral equilibrium on Walrasian lines. Even when formalising market interdependence 
in the mathematical appendix to the Principles, he simply treated the demand or sup-
ply of each commodity as a function of nothing but the price of the commodity itself. 
The links between the generation of income in factor markets and the expenditure of 
that income in product markets were left quite vague. Again, it must be recalled that 
                                                 
23 The same view can be found in Shove (1952: 300, note 5).  
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the development of comprehensive fully articulated equilibrium theories was not 
Marshall’s aim (Whitaker 1987: 360). 
The last sentence of this quotation from Whitaker is decisive: Marshall intentionally neglected  —
for defensible reasons — the project of studying mutual interdependency at the level of the entire 
economy.  
5.2 Friedman 
Oddly enough, authors championing Marshall against Walras, such as Friedman and Stigler, tend 
to agree with Schumpeter’s judgment. Friedman’s attitude is paradoxical. In his 1949 demand 
article, he castigated the Walrasian approach, but claimed that Marshallian analysis was also 
general:  
Marshall and Walras alike dealt with general equilibrium; partial equilibrium as usu-
ally conceived is but a special kind of general equilibrium analysis — unless indeed 
partial equilibrium analysis is taken to mean erroneous general equilibrium analysis 
(Friedman [1949] 1953: 90).  
To me, the meaning of this statement is hard to fathom. Perhaps, we have here a sort of territorial 
dispute. The term ‘general equilibrium’ has a positive connotation of completeness, while the 
term ‘partial equilibrium’ suggests an admission of incompleteness. Hence the struggle of 
Marshallian authors to stop the Walrasian camp from monopolising the field with positive 
connotations. Little is to be gained from this attempt. To Friedman, industry analysis has 
advantages of its own that are lost when the economy as a whole becomes the object of study. 
Why try to brand the study of an industry as general equilibrium analysis as if the failure to 
engage in the latter type of work were an unbearable stigma? It is illogical to hail Marshall for 
having resisted the temptation to develop a fully articulated theory of the economy as a whole and 
simultaneously to claim that Marshallian theory is in fact a general equilibrium theory. 
5. 3 Stigler 
For his part, Stigler argues that the opposition between partial and general equilibrium is a false 
one. While readily admitting that the Walrasian perspective is more general than the Marshallian 
one, Stigler claims that Walras’s approach is not really general, as it still comprises a series of 
data that are taken as given. 
A partial equilibrium is one which is based on only a restricted range of data. … 
General equilibrium is ostensibly based on all of the data relevant to the problem 
which is being studied. … But general equilibrium is a misnomer: no economic 
analysis has ever been general in the sense that it considered all relevant data. … The 
most that can be said is that general studies are more inclusive than partial equilib-
rium studies, never that they are complete (Stigler, 1946: 28).  
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The flaw in Stigler’s reasoning lies in his failure to separate two types of data or given: those 
elements which are considered as given because they do not belong to the ultimate theoretical 
quaesitum, on the one hand, and those elements which do belong to the quaesitum but which are 
provisionally ignored for the purpose of tractability, on the other. As a result, he misses a basic 
methodological difference between Marshall and Walras. Buchanan (1958) aptly captures the 
point at issue. Coming close to the Walrasian standpoint, he considers that the genuine ceteris 
paribus variables are the fundamental “wants, resources, and technology, the values for which, at 
least conceptually, are not modified by the changes imposed on the system” (1958: 260). By 
contrast, the variables that are held constant in partial analysis  
are among the total set of interdependent variables of the system. They are treated as 
parameters because the analyst desires to work with a subset rather than the whole 
set. But subset analysis will yield economically meaningful results only if the final 
shifts in the values of the parameters are reasonably small (Buchanan 1958: 260). 
5. 4 Dardi 
Another, more recent, attempt at defending the view that Marshallian theory is a general equilib-
rium theory is worth considering. Marco Dardi (2003) suggested that equilibrium is not an on/off 
property of the economy. When a shock arises in an ideal situation where the economy is fully in 
equilibrium, only a fraction of the economy is affected by it. While this section of the economy 
enters a state of disequilibrium, other sections remain in equilibrium. Hence, Dardi claims, the 
questions to be addressed are of the type: how much equilibrium is there in an economy? What 
would be the minimum conceivable level of equilibrium? The economy is in partial equilibrium 
because parts of it are in equilibrium while others are in disequilibrium. If this view is taken, 
there is no longer an opposition to be drawn between partial and general equilibrium. The notion 
of partial equilibrium refers to the degree to which the overall economy is in equilibrium. An 
economy can be at one and the same time in equilibrium and in disequilibrium, with disequilib-
rium pertaining to the parts of the economy that are affected by the shock and equilibrium to 
those parts which remain unaffected. To Dardi, the opposite of partial equilibrium is partial 
disequilibrium rather than general equilibrium! 
Dardi’s reconstruction is clever and appealing. It provides a further justification for Marshall’s 
strategy of studying parts of the economy in isolation from the others.  Still, against my definition 
of the partial/general equilibrium distinction, Dardi’s analysis is undoubtedly a partial equilibrium 
approach. Moreover, it fails to resolve the basic problem facing any partial equilibrium or 
industry analysis: the fact that there is no way of delineating one industry from another as a 
matter of principle (rather than in empirical way).  
 
6. Concluding remarks  
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My aim in this paper was to clarify the neglected issue of what is the range of views about the 
relationship between Marshallian and Walrasian theory. I have shown that two opposite stand-
points are present, the complementary and the alternative research programme views. I have 
endorsed the latter but expressed several doubts about the way it is usually defended. In particu-
lar, I have argued that there is no way of saying that either the Marshallian or the Walrasian 
approach is superior to the other. To me, such an attempts at a claim of supremacy claim is vain 
(and, of course, the same judgement holds for Walrasians claiming that their approach is superior 
to the Marshallian). Finally, I have addressed the claim made by some authors that the existence 
of notes XIV and XXI in the Appendix of Marshall’s Principles warrants the conclusion that he 
developed a general equilibrium analysis parallel to that of Walras. This claim, I have shown, 
does not stand up to close scrutiny. 
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